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THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS:
IMPACT ON ECONOMIC POLICY
AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY
REGARDING WOMEN IN EMPLOYMENT*
Marilyn L. Pilkington**
I. Introduction
To what extent does the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 limit
economic liberty in service of the rights and freedoms it expressly guaran-
tees? To what extent does the Charter shift from legislatures to courts the
power to determine important questions which have an impact on eco-
nomic policy*making? These questions require analysis of the operation
of the Charter in diverse spheres.
In this note, I assess the effect of the equality provisions of the Charter
on the position of women in employment. I argue that the expectation of
some that section 152 of the Charter will be a significant instrument for
achieving equality in employment, and the concern of others that it will be
a significant impediment to the economic liberty of employers, are alike
based on a misapprehension of its probable impact. I first outline briefly
the nature of the inequality between women and men in employment and
then consider to what extent the Charter compels its eradication. Finally, I
examine whether the nature and pace of the required changes will be left
to politically accountable institutions or determined by the courts.
H. The Inequality of Women and Men in Employment
An ever increasing number of women are working outside the home,
but the range of and remuneration for their employment lags behind that
of men. Men and women are largely segregated into "male" and "female"
occupations;3 yet even within the occupations in which women predomi-
* This paper was originally prepared for a Symposium held in April, 1988. It has been amended to
include references to cases decided up to December, 1987 which relate to the analysis set forth.
00 Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
1. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 198, c. 11.
2. Section 15 of the Charter.
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection
and equal benefit of the law without disrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program, or activity that has as its object the ame-
lioretion of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvan-
taged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical dis-
ability.
3. 77% of employed women work in clerical, service, sales, health or teaching jobs; 26% are in the
clerical category: Canada, Women in the Labour Force: 1986-87 Edition (Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1987)
at 17.
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nate,4 men have higher average incomes.5 In 1985, women's earnings
ranged from 51% of men's in sales to 66.7% of men's in clerical work.8 The
gap appears to be gradually narrowing. In 1971, the average annual earn-
ings of women employed full-time was 59.7% of men's,7 but by 1985, the
percentage had increased to 65.5%.8 The gap is narrower for younger than
for middle-aged workers. For the year 1982, average annual earnings for
women in the 25-34 year old age group were 78.2% of men's, as compared
with 58.7% in the 45-54 year old age group.9
Not only do women benefit less than men from full-time employment,
but they are at a further disadvantage in that more of them tend to work
part-time. In 1985, 26.3% of female workers were employed part-time, as
compared with 7.6% of employed men, and 71.9% of all part-time workers
were women. 10 The failure to provide part-time workers with proportion-
ally equal pay and benefits11 thus has a greater adverse impact on women.
To the extent that men and women do not participate equally in the
range and benefits of employment, women are a disadvantaged group.
Their disadvantage results from a number of inter-related differences be-
tween women and men referable to the nature and quality of their educa-
tion and training, the nature and continuity of their work experience,
their mobility and flexibility, their responsibility for child care and house-
hold management, and their expectations and tastes. These differences are
not absolute; rather, they are conditioned by cultural and social values and
in turn perpetuate stereotypes which re-enforce those values.
It is sometimes argued that if women are disadvantaged, it is due nei-
ther to discrimination, nor to their reproductive role, but is the result of
the choices they themselves make.12 But why is it that women tend to invest
less in education or training? Why is it that their work patterns are not like
to those of men? Why do they have different expectations and tastes? Why
is it that they end up assuming the major responsibility for household man-
agement and child care? It is not because of biological necessity but is
rather due to ingrained and interlocking expectations about the role of
women.
No doubt a portion of the wage gap and occupational segregation can
be attributed to overt discrimination against women, but even that, for the
4. Ibid., at 36, 48.
5. Ibid., at 35: "...in 1984 and 1985, there were no occupational categories where the average earnings of
women exceeded those of men."
6. Ibid., at 47.
7. Women in Canada- A Statitiica Report (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1985) at 61.
8. Women in the Labour Force, supra, note 3 at 45. See also at 36: "In 1985, women's average wages as a
percentage of men's showed some gain in half of the 24 listed occupations."
9. Women in Canada: A Statistical Report, supra, note 7 at 61.
10. Women in the Labour Force, supra, note 3 at 5, 22, 23.
11. See Jeannine David-McNeil, "The Changing Economic Status of the Female Labour Force in Can-
ada", in Towards Equity. Proceedings of a Colloquium on the Economic Status of Women in the Labour Market
(Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, Minister of Supply and Services, 1985) 1 at 4.
12. See, e.g., the commentary of Professor Jack Cart which follows this paper.
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most part, is the result of stereotypical notions which reflect the systemic
disadvantages under which women labour. Overt discrimination is an ef-
fect as well as a cause of women's disadvantaged condition. Theoretically,
as Professor Becker has argued, a preference to hire, work or deal with men
rather than women, regardless of whether the preference is based on preju-
dice or misinformation, would be costly and in the long run competitive
market forces should dissipate it.13 However, Professor Gunderson has
pointed out that an employer confronted with a costly error may rational-
ize rather than correct it.14 When the prejudice, misinformation or ration-
alization is widely held, the economic costs may not be detected. In any
event, as Professor Gunderson notes, even when the costs of discrimina-
tion are detected, the cost of adjusting to correct them may outweigh the
benefits of doing so.' 5
The tendency of sex stereotyping and discriminatory behaviour is to
reduce the opportunities available to women, overcrowd those occupa-
tions which are considered open and drive down women's wages within
those occupations.' s Thus, even when women make work commitments
comparable to those made by men - investing in training, assuming
equivalent risks and responsibilities, accepting equivalent working condi-
tions, such as working shifts - they still tend to be paid less than men.
Hence nurses, for example, are paid less than electrical repairers.17
Social attitudes regarding the role of women, although changing, are
deeply ingrained. The results of one American study suggest that the disad-
vantage of being a woman outweighs the disadvantage of being a member
of a minority race in that there is greater occupational segregation be-
tween white men and white women than there is between white men and
black men.18 Another American study demonstrates that there is no wage
gap between white and black women, as there is between white and black
men. 19 Even women who have never married and who therefore tend not
to be burdened with extra household and childcare duties appear to be dis-
13. Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Dixrimination (Chicago: U. of Chicago Preas, 1967) and various other
publications, including "An Economic Theory of Discrimination", in W.E. Block and M.A. Walker
(eds.), Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Equal Opportunity (Vancouver. The Fraser Institute,
1982,, at 129.
14. Morley Gunderson, "Labour Market Aspects of Inequality in Employment and Their Application
to Crown Corporations" in Research Studies of the Commi.sion on Equality in Employment, Royal Com-
mission on Equality in Employment (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985) (Com-
missioner-. Judge Rosalie Silverman Abella) I at 14.5.
15. Ibid., at 7.
16. Ibid., at S.
17. In 1983, a general duty hospital nurse (likely to be a woman) earned $507 per week whereas an elec-
trical repairer (likely to be a man) earned $525 for the same hours of work: Wage Rates Salaries and
Hours of Labour (Ottawa: Supply and Servios Canada, 1983), Table A, Maintenance Trades; Table A,
item 48, Hospitals.
18. See V. Fuchs, "Differences in Hourly Earnings Between Men and Women" (19"71) 94 Monthly Labor
Review, at 9-15, cited by Naresh C. Agarwal in "Economic Costs of Employment Discrimination" in
Research Studies, supra, note 14, 401 at 409.
19. Walter Williams, "On Discrimination, Prejudice, Racial Income Differentials, and Affirmative Ac-
tion", in Block and Walker, supra, note 13, 69 at 70-73.
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advantaged in employment - not in comparison with single men, but as
compared to men as a whole.20
Where neither market forces nor government intervention correct
these inequalities the economy itself may suffer the consequences. In a
study conducted for the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment,
Professor Agarwal argues:
Such underutilization of the minority labour force can cause a
serious loss of potential national output. It can also prevent the
labour market from efficiently correcting demand and supply im-
balances in the "bottleneck" industries and occupations. This in
turn can cause higher rates of inflation in the economy. Employ-
ment discrimination can also produce a higher incidence of pov-
erty among minority workers, necessitating higher social assistance
costs.
2 1
The economic costs of discrimination may tend to encourage employ-
ers to give it up. Similarly, the economic, social and political costs of dis-
crimination may impel governments to adopt policies and enact laws to
eliminate discrimination and facilitate equality. Eradication of the in-
equality between women and men in employment would require funda-
mental and far-reaching social change. The question I seek to address,
however, is not whether governments, employers and others should seek
to effect such systemic change, but whether they can now be constitution-
ally compelled to do so. In other words, the question is the issue of whether
the extent and pace of such change will be left to politically accountable
institutions or determined by the courts.
III. The Impact of the Equality Guarantees.
A. No Affirmative Constitutional Obligation to Ensure Equality
The Charter imposes no express affirmative constitutional obligation
on governments or legislatures to take steps to enhance equality or eradi-
cate inequality. The strongest suggestion of such an obligation appears in
section 36(1)22 which goes no further than to record a government commit-
ment - but not a guarantee - to "promot[e] equal opportunities for the
20. See Walter E. Block, "Economic Intervention, Discrimination and Unforeseen Consequences" in
Block and Walker, spra, note 13, 103 at 108-118, wherein he compares the wages earned by never-
married men and women and finds a female/male earnings ratio of 99.2%. However, as Prof. Gun-
derson notes, jupra, note 14 at 12: The problem with this methodology is that it likely introduces a
bias in the other direction (i.e., understating the degree of discrimination) because males and fe-
males who are never-married and over 30 may systematically differ in terms of unmeasured factors
that are correlated with their earnings. For example, females who are over 30 and never married
may be career-oriented whereas males in that state may have personality traits that are undesirable
for labour market behaviour. In esence, one may be comparing a select sample of some of the 'best'
females with some of the 'worst' males; hence, one ought not to be surprised that much of the overall
earnings gap disappears. (Formally, this is an econometric problem of sample selection bias due to
differences in unobserved heterogeneity.)
21. Agarwal, aspr, note 18 at 403.
22. The provision is included in Part III of the Charters Equalization and Regional Disparities
36(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or
the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and
the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, are com-
mitted to
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians,
(b) ftLthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality of all Canadians.
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well-being of Canadians." As Professor Hogg points out, "this obligation is
probably too vague, and too political, to be justiciable."2 3 In addition, the
commitment, though couched in general terms, is limited by the context
and the heading under which it appears to regional disparities.? Accord-
ingly, it imposes no affirmative constitutional obligation even to provide
equal opportunities to Canadian men and women, much less to establish
their equality in Canadian society.25
It may be argued that section 28, which guarantees all Charter rights
and freedoms equally to male and female persons, could operate together
with a liberal construction of section 728 to impose an affimative constitu-
tional obligation to provide equal economic security to men and women.27
However, this argument faces significant - and probably insurmountable
- hurdles: first, establishing that "security of the person" includes eco-
nomic security; and second, establishing that such economic security
means more than "the ability to earn enough to provide necessaries."
28
As discussed below, section 15 of the Charter does not guarantee either
equality of opportunity or equality in the allocation of power and benefits
in Canadian society. It is limited to precluding governments from creating
or perpetuating inequalities by operation of law.29 Governments are not
required to take steps to enhance equality but are merely permitted to do
so.30 In short, the Charter does not guarantee equality at large, but only
equality in the operation of law.
B. Equality in the Operation of Law
Section 15(1) of the Charter guarantees procedural equality in the ap-
plication of the law (equality before the law) and substantive equality in the
provisions of the law (equality under the law, equal protection of the law
and equal benefit of the law). Theoretically, it is possible that this guaran-
23. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1965), at 119.
24. For a discussion of the extent to which headings and context will be considered to restrict the appli-
ration of otherwise general 1anguage such as that used in section 36(1), see ShapinkAr v. The Law Soci-
ety of Upper Canada (1964), [19 4]1S.C.R 357,53 N.R. 169,9 D.L.R (4th) 161. See Hogg, supra, note
23 at 659.
25. But see Mary Eberts, "Sex and Equality Rights", in Bayefsky and Eberts (eds.), Equality Rights and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 19a5), 183 at 225.
26. Section 7 of the Charter.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
See Rejfrence re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act (1985), [19651 2 S.C.& 486, 24 D.L.R (4th) 536,
[1986] 1 W.W.R* 481 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Morgentaler, Smolingand Scott (1968), 82 N.R 1 (S.C.C.), in which
the Supreme Court of Canada construes section 7 of the Charter as protecting substantive as well es
procedural interests.
27. See Mary Cornish, "Ontario Equal Pay Legislation as Sex Discrimination Under the Charter", in
Report on the Statute Audit Prject (Charter of Rights Educational Fund, Toronto, 1965), at 523-47; and
"Present Equal Pay for Equal Work Legislation: Does It Violate the Charter?", in Equality Rights and
Employment Law: Preparing for Fundamental Change (Toronto: The Canadian Institute for Professional
Development, 1965), B.1 at B.24-27 and B.39.
28. See the discussion in Re Service Employees' Intl Union and Broaduway Manor Nursing Home (1963), 4
D.L.R. (4th) 231, 44 O.R (2d) 392 (Div. Ct.), per O'Leary J., referring to the Law Reform Commission
of Canada's consideration of "security of the person". See Hogg, sspra, note 23 at 745.
29. See section 15(1) of the Charter, supra note 2.
30. See section 15(2) of the Charter, supra, note 2.
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tee could be very broadly read as requiring that everyone "benefit equally
from the existence of a given legal regime,"3 1 thus imposing an affirmative
obligation on legislatures, governments, and courts to cure inequalities. In
its widest conceivable scope, then, section 15(1) could be interpreted as
mandating a socio-economic revolution. It goes without saying that there
is no evidence in the legislative history of the Charter that this result was
intended; nor would this interpretation be textually sound. Section 15(1)
guarantees only that the law will operate without discrimination. It does
not require that the law be used to put everyone in an equal position. The
express allowance of affirmative action in section 15(2) would not be nec-
essary if section 15(1) imposed a constitutional obligation to enhance
equality and eradicate inequality.
At the other end of the spectrum, the narrowest meaning that could be
given to the guarantee of equality in the operation of law would restrict it
to laws actually enacted or promulgated (as the phrase "laws of Canada" in
section 101 of the Constiution Ad, 1867 has been restricted). This inter-
pretation has been much criticized. 3 For the purpose of section 15(1),
courts are more likely to hold that - as in sections 13 and 52(1)3 of the
Charter - "law" includes the common law. Principles of common law
which could be codified in or altered by legislation should be treated as
subject to the same equality standards as is legislation.
If the equality provisions apply only to legislation, their impact could
theoretically be constrained by the political majority, or at least by those
who dominate the political process. By refusing to pass new legislation or
by repealing existing legislation the majority could remove whole areas of
economic and social policy from the purview of section 15(1). Professor
Tarnopolsky, as he then was, explains:
Section 15 refers to equality before and under the law, as well
as equal protection and benefit of the law. Therefore, although an
anti-discrimination law would itself have to conform to section 15,
it, and not section 15, would be directly applicable to discrimina-
tory actions by private persons.-
31. This reading is considered, but not advocated, by Prof. Marc E. Gold, "A Principled Approach to
Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry" (1982), 4 Supreme Ct. L. Rev. 131 at 135, note 21.
32. Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1962, c.1 1, section 101:
The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to Time pro-
vide ... for the Establishment ofany additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws
of Canada.
33. Peter W. Hogg, "Federalism and the Jurisdiction of Canadian Courts" (1981) 30 U.N.. L.. 9; John M.
Evans, "Federal Jurisdiction - a Lamentable Situation" (1981) 59 Can. Bar Rev. 124; John B. Laskin
and Robert J. Sharpe, "Constricting Federal Court Jurisdiction: A comment on Fuller Construc-
tion" (1980) 30 U.T.L.. 283.
34. R v. Therens (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R 613, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 655, [1985] 4 W.W.R. 286 per LeDain J.,
obiter, at 680; see Hogg, supra, note 23 at 684-86.
35. Dolphin Delivery v. Retail, Wiolmeate and DepL Store Union (1986), [186] 2 S.C.R. 573, 33 D.L.R. (4th)
174, [1986] 1 W.W.R. 577 per McIntyre J., at 190-191.
36. Walter S. Thrnopolsky, "The Equality Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1983) 61
Can. Bar Rev. 242 at 256.
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This view is also reflected in cases like Harrison v. University of British
Co/umbia37 in which the British Columbia Supreme Court held that section
15(1) applies to "law" and to the way in which law is applied; it is not rele-
vant to conduct unconnected with the creation or application of law. In
the absence of legislation, entitlements and obligations would be deter-
mined in accordance with the common law. Yet according to the reasoning
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dolphin Delivery v. Retail, Wholesale and
Departmoent Store Union,38 the Charter would apply to litigation between pri-
vate parties based on common law "only in so far as the common law is the
basis of some governmental action which, it is alleged, infringes a guaran-
teed right or freedom."38 This view has been criticized because it affords
little scope for the operation of section 15(1) in private sector employment
disputes governed by the common law.40
Even if the Charter did apply to ordinary private litigation involving
common law issues there would appear to be little scope for its application
to sex equality in employment. At common law, an employer can contract
with an employee for her services at whatever wage and working condi-
tions are mutually agreeable in the circumstances. Presumably, the terms
of such a contract, which are determined by the parties and not by the com-
mon law,41 would not be reviewable under section 15(1) of the Charter.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Charter does not guarantee equality
to all Canadians. It imposes no affirmative obligation on legislatures, gov-
ernments or courts to achieve equality; rather, it requires equality only in
the operation of the law. To the extent that relationships and activities are
not regulated by law, they are not subject to review on equality grounds.
This interpretation enhances the choices available to democratically
elected governments under the Constitution. They need not intervene in
matters of economic and social policy, but, if they do, they must provide
for procedural and substantive equality in the operation of the law. Hence
the guarantee of equality in the operation of law does not preempt politi-
cal responsibility by requiring legislative action, but where the legislature
does choose to intervene it must meet constitutional standards. Thus, if
those who favour de-regulation could actually persuade a majority to re-
turn to laissez-faire, they could limit much of the impact of the equality guar-
antee.
37. (1986), 30 D.L.R. (4th) 206 at 215; 14 C.C.E.L. 90 at 99 (B.C.S.C.). The Court held that mandatory
retirement practices at the University did not involve "law" within the meaning of subsection 15(1)
of the Charter.
38. Dolphin Delivery, supra, note 35 at 191 ff. See also Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association
(1986), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 728, 54 O.R. (2d) 513, 14 O.A.C. 194 (CA.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied
(1967), 73 N.R. 76n, 58 O.R. (2d) 274n., 21 C.R.R. 114n.
39. Dolphin Deliery, supa, note 35, per McIntyre J. at 195.
40. (See Brian Slattery, "The Charter's Relevance to Private Litigation: Does Dolphin Deliver?" (1987) 32
McGill L.. 905.
41. Where the common law does distinguish between the rights and obligations of women and men (as,
for example, in obliging a husband to support his wife but not vice versa) the Charter could apply.
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C. The Standards of Equality and the Structure of Analysis
The impact of the equality provisions will depend not only on the
range of activities and relationships regulated by law - which is at least
partly within political control - but also on the standards of equality ap-
plied by courts when the operation of a law is challenged. Where sex equal-
ity is at issue, courts must deal with two questions. The first is whether it is
sufficient simply to accord women "formal legal equality".42 It is beyond
controversy that, at the very least, section 15(1) of the Charter guarantees
this kind of equality. Women are entitled to the same legal rights and pos-
sess the same legal capacities as are enjoyed by men. They are entitled to
vote,4 3 to hold property, to enter into contracts, to hold public office and
to enter the professions to the same extent as are men. The removal of legal
disabilities and incapacities, while necessary, will not, however, be suffi-
cient to establish equality before and under the law.
Courts must select an appropriate test for determining whether the
law operates equally in conferring protections and benefits on women and
men. At least two choices are available. First, a court could hold that equal-
ity in the operation of law is denied only if the law treats men and women
differently. This approach would ignore any physiological or socio-eco-
nomic differences between women and men which could cause the same
treatment to have a different impact on them. Proponents of this ap-
proach argue that, even though its short-term impact on women would be
harsh, it is the only way to ensure eventual elimination of stereotypes
which subjugate women.44 The difficulty with this approach, however, is
that it forces women to conform to male norms in order to be "equal",
which may simply be another type of inequality. In my view, courts can
guard against the influence of stereotypes without denying that, in some
circumstances, women and men may require different treatment in order
to achieve equality. It is important, however, to determine, first, whether
there is a prima fade inequality in the operation of law, and, second, as a
separate question, whether any such inequality, can be justified in constitu-
tional terms. It is at this latter stage that one must guard against the influ-
ence of stereotypes.
For the purpose of determining whether a law prina fade infringes
equality, impact as well as treatment is material.45 A law which appears to
be neutral in its application to women and men may actually operate to the
disadvantage of women and infringe section 15(1) of the Charter as, for ex-
ample, where requirements for entitlement to government pension bene-
fits fail to take account of and unduly penalize women who have
withdrawn from the labour force to bear and raise children. Such a provi-
42. See Eberts, supra, note 25 at 185.
43. This right is expresly guaranteed by section 3 and section 28 of the Charter.
44. Wendy Williams, "Sex Discrimination Under the Charter. Some Problems of Theory" (1984),
C.H.HH. C83-1, 083-4.
45. See Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association, supra, note 38 at 52; and Re Ontario Human Rights Com-
mission and SimpansSears Ltd. (1985), 64 N.R. 161,23 D.L.H. (4th) 321,52 O.. (2d) 799 (S.C.C.), per
McIntyre J., at 331-32 (D.L.1.).
ECONOMIC LIBERTY REGARDING WOMEN IN EMPLOYMENT 275
sion should be struck down leaving government to develop other neutral
criteria which accommodate the career models of both men and women.
Accordingly, I suggest that a court should find aprna fade inequality in the
operation of law if: (1) the law denies women formal legal equality; (2) the
law treats women differently from men; or (3) the law has a disparate im-
pact on men and women.
Once a person challenging the operation of a law has established a
prima face inequality, the onus should then shift to the proponent of the
law to establish one of two things, namely: either that the law is intended to
ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged women - whether individu-
ally or as a group - and is therefore justified under section 15(2) of the
Charter, or that the law distinguishes between men and women in a way
which is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society as pro-
vided in section 1 of the Charter.48 In light of the special priority given to
the guarantee of equal rights and freedoms to male and female persons un-
der section 28 of the Charter,47 the standard of justification for any such
distinction should be strict. As will be argued later, in my view the only dis-
tinctions which should be upheld under section 1 are those specifically re-
lated to reproductive differences.
The advantages of adopting this approach to the sex equality provi-
sions of the Charter are two-fold. First, it accords a reasonable meaning to
each of section 1, sections 15(1) and 15(2), and section 28. Second, it en-
ables courts to distinguish reasonably among the three types of sex in-
equality which might appear in the operation of law. The first type consists
of special protections, benefits, opportunities or preferences provided to
individual women or women as a group in order to compensate for the
effects of unequal treatment in the past or to interrupt the cycle of socio-
economic inequality so that it will not be perpetuated into the future. Such
measures could be justified, where appropriate, under section 15(2). Inso-
far as these measures and policies are ultimately effective, the opportunity
to make such justifications would be temporary.
The second type of sex inequality which may appear in the operation
of law is based on what seems to be - at least in the present state of techno-
logical development - an immutable difference between the sexes,
namely, the ability to bear children. Special benefits or protections ac-
corded to women on the basis of this reproductive distinction could not be
justified under section 15(2) of the Charter as ameliorating conditions of
disadvantage; women are childbearers by reason of genetics and not be-
cause they are disadvantaged. However, special benefits or protections re-
lated to childbearing could be justified under section 1 of the Charter. By
operation of section 28, section 1 is arguably limited to justifying only
48. Section 1 of the Charter.
The Canadian Charter of Righs and Preedoms guarantes the rights and freedoms set out in it sub-
ject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a flee
and democratic society.
47. Section 28 of the Charter.
Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaran.
teed equally to male and female persons.
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those sex inequalities in the operation of the law which are required be-
cause of reproductive differences.
Finally, any sex inequality which is not justified as afr-mative action
or based on reproductive differences would result in a declaration that the
law which embodies it is of no force and effect.4 Any law which has a dispa-
rate impact on women, denies to them an opportunity or benefit which is
available to men, or confers on them a "protection" or "benefit" not avail-
able to men, would infringe the Charter, unless, as noted above, it could be
upheld under section 15(2) or section 1.
Requiring the proponent of an otherwise infringing law to justify the
law as either a temporary protection or opportunity, or as necessitated by
immutable sex differences, means that a court must be prepared and will-
ing to distinguish real differences which obtain between the sexes from dif-
ferences that reflect social and cultural role stereotypes. Alternative
approaches to the construction of those provisions of the Charter con-
cerned with sex equality cloud this important distinction. Thus, if the Char-
ter were read as requiring the same treatment of the sexes so as to break the
hold of stereotypes, women whose lives have been constrained by those
stereotypes would then be deprived, unfairly, of protections upon which
they have had to rely. If, on the other hand, socially and culturally induced
role separation is accepted as a legitimate basis for differential treatment,
the sex stereotypes will be perpetuated indefinitely. By separating real dif-
ferences from culturally determined differences, courts can uphold only
those special protections and benefits tailored to ameliorate conditions of
disadvantage or required by physiological differences. In the process sex
stereotypes which have already crumbled a good deal will continue to
crumble. If governments introduce affirmative policies which, together
with changes in social attitudes, enable women to participate more effec-
tively in political and economic spheres, gradually the protections and
benefits - other than those related to childbearing - may no longer be
necessary.
IV. Potential Problems
A. "Discrimination" in Section 15()
The rights guaranteed by section 15(1) of the Charter is equality in the
operation of law without discrimination. If "discrimination" merely
means "distinction,"49 then it poses no problem for the analysis suggested
above. If, on the other hand, it means "unwarranted distinction,"50 an in-
equality could be justified under section 15(1) itself without recourse to
section 15(2) or section 1 of the Charter. At this early stage of equality adju-
48. Section 52(1) of the Constitution Ac4 1982, supra, note 32:
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with
the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
49. Hogg, supra, note 23 at 800.
50. See Gold, supra, note 32.
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dication, several courts have construed "discrimination" to mean "unwar-
ranted distinction", holding that the purpose of section 15(1) is to ensure
that persons who are similarly situated be similarly treated.5' Courts
should, however, be cautious in adopting this approach, particularly in
cases involving alleged discrimination on the ground of sex.
In my view, the definition of "discrimination" as simple "distinction"
is to be preferred for several reasons. First, it provides a consistent and sen-
sible definition of "discriminate" in section 6(3) and "discrimination" in
section 15(1). 2 Second, it is nearer in meaning to dictionary definitions.53
Third, if the operative part of section 15(1) of the Charter - like clause 1(b)
of the Canadian Bill of Right64 - proscribes denial of equality in the opera-
tion of law with or without "discrimination" on a named ground, it should
not be more difficult to establish prima fade infringement of a right when
discrimination is alleged; only establishment of the distinction, not its un-
warranted nature, should be required. Finally, and most important, it en-
sures that any justification of an inequality complies either with section
15(2) or with the onus and standard of proof required by sections 1 and 28
of the Charter.55
B. Effect of Seetion 28
Section 28 of the Charter66 appears to preclude Parliament or a legisla-
ture from overriding, pursuant to section 33,57 the guarantee of equality in
the operation of law without discrimination on the basis of sex. Presum-
ably this is not its only function since section 28 was inserted in the draft
Charter before section 33 was introduced.5 8
51. See, for example, Re Andrews and Law Society of Britsih Columbia (196), 27 D.L.PR (4th) 600, [19661 4
W.W.R 242, 2 B.C.L.R. (2d) 305 (B.C.C.A.), decision pending in the Supreme Court of Canada; Re
Blainey and Ontario Hockey A.ociation, supra, note 38; Smith, Kline & French Labomtories Ltd. v. A.G. Can-
ada (1986),34 D.L.R. (4th) 584,12 C.P.R. (3d) 385 (Fed. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refted April 9,
1987 (unreported).
52. See Eberts, aspre, note 25 at 210.
53. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary:
Discriminate: "to make or constitute a difference in or between; to differentiate..." Discrimina.
tion: "the action of discriminating or distinguishing, a distinction (made with the mind or in
action); the condition of being discriminated or distinguished."
54. S.C. 1960, c. 44, section 1(b):
"It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed and shall continue to
eidst without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the fol-
lowing human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely, ... (b) the right of the individual tq
equality before the law and the protection of the law; ... See Curt v. The Queen (1972), [19721
S.C.R. 889 at 896, 26 D.L.R (3d) 603 at 611, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181 at 189.
55. It should be noted, however, that allowing justiflication of a distinction as warranted under section
15(1) would not necessarily be inconsistent with the scheme of the Charter (cf. Eberts, supra, note 25
at 215.) Other rights, including the right to be secure against unreaonable search and seizure (sec-
tion 8) and the right not to be arbitrarily detained (section 9) require a judgment to be made about
the validity of a restriction before recourse to section 1.
56. See, supra, note 47.
57. Section 331) of the Charter
Parliament or a legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or a
legislature, as the cae may be, that the Act ora provision thereofshall operate notwithstanding
a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of the Charter.
58. Chaviva Hosek, "Women and Constitutional Process", in K. ianting and RL Simeon (eds.), And No
One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy and the Consttution Act (Toronto: Methuen, 1983), 280 at 291-95.
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The impact of section 28, other than to exclude the operation of sec-
tion 33, is uncertain. One suggested interpretation is that section 28 pre-
cludes any resort to section 1 or section 15(2) to justify a law which operates
differently on men and women. This interpretation should be rejected be-
cause it begs the question of what is required in order to "guarantee rights
equally to male and female persons." It leads inevitably to implementation
of a concept of equality which admits of no differential treatment in order
to break the legal reinforcement of sexual stereotypes.
This approach to achieving equality does not appear to be widely ap-
proved even by Canadian feminists,5 9 let alone by those governments
which agreed to the Charter and those legislators who enacted it. A holding
that section 28 precludes resort to section 1 would put pressure on the judi-
ciary to adopt a definition of "discrimination" in section 15(1) which
would enable a court to find that some differences in the operation of the
law can be justified. This development could have the unfortunate result
of circumventing the onus and substantial burden of proof imposed by
section 1 on a party seeking to uphold legislation which otherwise in-
fringes the Charter. This risk could be avoided if the equality guarantee
were regarded as composed of sections 15(1), 15(2), and section 1 read to-
gether. In that event, a role could still be found for section 28.
As argued above, section 28 of the Charter serves to emphasize that un-
equal treatment of women and men before or under the law is to be par-
ticularly closely scrutinized to ensure that it is warranted in fact and is not
simply a reflection of stereotypes. Furthermore, it gives priority to the
equality rights of women and men over other guaranteed rights. Thus, as
Professor Hogg asserts, section 28 operates to ensure that "other provi-
sions of the Charter be implemented without discrimination between the
sexes."60 This may be particularly important in light of section 27 which
requires that the Charter be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada.
Accordingly, section 28 could be given a fair and full reading without con-
struing it as excluding resort to section 1 and section 15(2).
V. Standards of Proof
Because section 28 of the Charter gives special emphasis and priority
to guaranteeing rights equally to male and female persons, rigorous scru-
tiny should be given to any law which treats men and women differently or
has a diverse impact upon them.8 1
A. Section 15(2)
Section 15(2) of the Charter is permissive. Despite the guarantee of
equality in section 15(1), section 15(2) allows a legislature or government
59. See, e.g., Eberts, upra, note 25, and Mary Jane Mossman, "Gender, Equality and the Charter" in Re-
arch Studies, spra, note 14 at 299.
60. Hogg, supra, note 23 at 802. Note, however, that Prot. Hogg considers section 28 to be limited to this
role.
61. See text, spra, at note 43ff.
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to enact a law, establish a program or enter into an activity that has as its
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of sex. Section
15(2) could arguably operate in two different ways. First, it could provide
support for special protections or benefits which are designed to compen-
sate women for conditions created by their past disadvantage. Second, it
could support special programs designed to enhance the equal participa-
tion of women in society.
L Compensation
A law which distinguishes between men and women should not bejus-
tifiable on the basis that it compensates women for past disadvantages un-
less it is established that the law does not simply reflect a stereotype of the
nature and role of women but specifically seeks to redress a past disadvan-
tage. Thus a law which makes child support2 or family benefits63 available
only to female parents should be struck down because it reinforces a sex
role stereotype rather than compensating for any past disadvantage. Legis-
latures must define with more specificityj the groups they intend to benefit
and not rely on sex stereotypes which are thereby perpetuated.
It is important that legislatures take the initiative in curing equality
infringements, especially with respect to laws conferring protections and
benefits. Although courts have broad authority under section 24(1) to re-
dress Charter infringements,84 they are generally unwilling to read into in-
fringing legislation provisions that will cure the infringement66 Instead,
the infringing law is more likely to be declared to be of no force and effect.
In an appropriate case the court could declare a constitutional exemp-
tion,8 but it is unlikely to do so where the effect would be to extend a finan-
cial benefit to another category of individuals. It is for the legislature to
decide whether to redefine the entitlement to benefit or take no action at
all and thereby eliminate the benefit entirely. The court's role is simply to
ensure that in allocating benefits, governments do not infringe constitu-
tional rights. Accordingly, although courts may identify inequalities in the
operation of law, the initiative to cure them should remain primarily with
the legislatures. As institutions the legislatures are better equipped than
the courts to determine how a law should be framed to apply equally to
62. Re Shewchuh and Rioard (1988), 28 D.L.R. (4th) 429, [1988] 4 W.W.RL 289, 2 B.C.L.R (2d) 324
(B.C.C.A).
63. AG. of Nova Scotia v. Phillips (1986), 34 D.L.R (4th) 633, 76 N.S.RE (2d) 240 (N.S.S.C., App. Div.).
64. Section 24(1) of the Charter
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this charter, have been infringed or denied
may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers
appropriate and just in the circurnstances.
65. l urerv. S uhaaIn. (1984), [t964]2S.C.R 145, 11 D.L.R (4th) 641, [194]6W.W.s57at6sq-6m,
AG. of Nova Scotia v. Phillips, supra, note 63.
68. In R v. Seaboyer (1987), 58 C.R (3d) 289 (Ont.C.A), a majority of the Court held, per Grange JA. at
306-313, that, where a legislative provision is not on its face inconsistent with the Charter, but occa,
sionaly its application might result in infringement of the Charter, the provision can be upheld,
subject to a constitutional exemption which renders it inoperative in those applications which
would inf inge the Charter.
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women and men in a manner which takes account of their different experi-
ences and needs.6 7
2. Preference or Affirmative Action
The merits and demerits of affirmative action are highly contentious
and beyond the scope of this paper in considering the extent to which sec-
tion 15(2) of the Charter constrains economic policy and economic liberty.
Prior to the Charter, there were no constitutional constraints placed upon a
legislature or government enacting or implementing an affirmative action
program. Section 15 imposes no constitutional obligation on govern-
ments to adopt affirmative action policies. It permits such policies, but
only to the extent that they come within section 15(2). Accordingly, there
are now some constraints placed on affirmative action which did not exist
prior to the enactment of the Charter.
Affirmative action is constitutional only if it applies to disadvantaged
individuals or groups and only insofar as its object is the amelioration of
conditions of disadvantage. While a court will no doubt defer to legislative
or governmental judgment in determining whether individuals or groups
are disadvantaged and whether a particular program is likely to ameliorate
the conditions of disadvantage, it will still require that such judgments be
reasonably exercised.
It is significant that section 15(2) of the Charter focuses not on "dis-
crimination," but rather on "disadvantage". In so doing it appears to re-
move from consideration the thorny question of the extent to which
inequality has resulted from discrimination as distinct from other cultural
and social processes. Accordingly, it may be argued that section 15(2) is suf-
ficiently broadly worded to justify measures in response to overall sys-
temic disadvantage whatever its source. This proposition is somewhat
clouded by the final clause of section 15(2) which provides that the disad-
vantaged individuals or groups include those that are disadvantaged be-
cause of race, sex, etc. Although this phrase does not demand proof of overt
discrimination, it could be read as requiring evidence of a causal connec-
tion between being disadvantaged and being a member of a particular race
or sex, etc. However, the final clause of section 15(2) must be read in con-
text. It permits laws, programs and activities which seek to improve the lot
of disadvantaged people in general, including - but not limited to -
those who are disadvantaged by reason of race or sex, etc. Hence section
15(2) of the Charter is not limited to curing inequality in the operation of
laws which discriminate among different groups of people.
It is not clear whether section 15(2) would support a program which
has as its object the amelioration of the conditions of a generally disadvan-
taged group, but which confers benefits not only on disadvantaged indi-
viduals who are members of that group but also on members who have
suffered no disadvantage.68 It is arguable, however, that all members of dis-
6.7. See Kathleen Lahey,Report on the Statute Audit Project, (Toronto: Charter of Rights Educational Fund,
1985), supra, note 27 at 1-30.
68. Katherine Swinton, "Restraints on Government Efforts to Promote Equality in Employment:
Labour Relations and Constitutional Considerations" in Research Studies, supra, note 14 at 287.
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advantaged groups are likely to have suffered some disadvantage from
stereotyped attitudes and social expectations. As well, a preference given
to any member of the group may provide a role model and assist in break-
ing down stereotypes for the group as a whole.
Similarly, it is unclear whether the amelioration of conditions of dis-
advantage applies only with respect to opportunities, or is also referable to
outcomes. As Professor Swinton explains:
[A] male employee, competing for a job with a qualified fe-
male craft worker, might argue that affirmative action is improper
at the hiring stage, for the disadvantage to the female group that
warrants redress is at the educational stage. Once women are
trained, they should be at the same starting line as males, and no
longer treated as a disadvantaged group. This would justify train-
ing tailored to the target group, but not job preferences.-
Critics of affirmative action argue that the progress made in the
United States toward racial equality is attributable more to programs di-
rected at achieving equality of opportunity than it is to programs designed
to achieve equality of outcome.70 It is argued that quotas and preferential
treatment in hiring
... harm highly competent minority persons, by making it appear
that their accomplishments are not due to their own efforts, but to
government "largesse"; they harm unqualified minority persons by
placing them in positions which expose their incompetence; they
harm minority persons excluded from affirmative action, by in-
creasing their frustration and lowering their motivation to attain
job qualifications on their own; as well, affirmative action exacer-
bates social and other inter-minority group animosity.71
It might further be argued that the cost of affirmative action to redress
disadvantage created by the interaction of various social forces should not
be shifted onto employers who are prevented from hiring the best quali-
fied employees, or onto job applicants who are denied jobs despite their
superior qualifications. Rather, the cost should be borne by society as a
whole through special information and training programs, publicly fi-
nanced parental leaves and adequate child care facilities.
A court might conceivably take into account evidence supporting
such arguments in deciding that "amelioration of conditions" applies only
to those programs which are aimed towards redressing the factors which
create disadvantage. Courts should, however, exercise restraint in limiting
the scope of affirmative action programs. If those who are not members of
the disadvantaged group consider that a particular affirmative action pro-
gram is ineffective - or indeed, too effective - they are in a position to
exert political pressure to alter the program.
69. Ibid.
70. See, e.g., Williams, sspr, note 19.
71. Block and Walker, Preface, supm, note 13 at xviii.
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B. Section 1
If an inequality in the operation of a law as between male and female
persons cannot be justified under section 15(2), there remains the possibil-
ity that it could be upheld under section 1 of the Charter. As discussed
above, the operation of section 1 is restricted by section 28 and by the avail-
ability of section 15(2)72 and should be limited to upholding those laws
which are based on the real reproductive differences between men and
women. For example, maternal leave limited to childbirth could be justi-
fied, but a more extended leave for childcare should be available for par-
ents of either sex. Laws which protect women of child-bearing age from
hazardous substances in the workplace might be upheld, but only to the
extent that it is established that the risk from such substances is limited to
child-bearing and does not affect child-siring.
It should be noted that in both of these examples, benefits are not con-
ferred on all women, but on a subset of women. The Supreme Court of
Canada has held that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy does not
amount to a denial of equality on the basis of sex.73 In response, Parliament
amended the Canadian Human Rights Act to provide that discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy or childbirth is discrimination on the basis of sex.74
Pregnancy is not expressly included in the prohibited distinctions of sec-
tion 15(1) of the Charter, but those distinctions are not exhaustive.h A court
could hold either that pregnancy is included in discrimination on the basis
of sex or is a separate distinction which, because it is one of the essential
capacities which distinguishes one sex from another, should be as closely
scrutinized as any other distinction which results in unequal operation of
law as between male and female persons. In either event, since rights are to
be guaranteed equally to male and female persons, a right available to
male persons should not be denied to pregnant female persons unless the
fact of pregnancy requires it.
Whether limitations are imposed or benefits conferred on the basis of
reproductive differences between men and women, under section 1 courts
should ensure that they are required by and limited to actual differences
and are not reflective of secondary stereotyped expectations that have
evolved from them.
72. See text at notes 42 to 60.
73. Blis v. AG. Canada (1978), [19'79] I S.C.RL 183,92 D.L.R. (3d) 417, [19'78] 6 W.W.R '711. See also the
similar holdingotthe United States Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,41 LEd 2d 256
(1974).
74. S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, as am. by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 143, section 2, adding section 3(2) to the Act.
See also the Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1961, c. 53, section 9, as am. by S.O. 1984, c. 58, section 39
and S.O. 1986, c. 64, section 7. See also the amendment to the United States Civil RightsAc Title VII,
42 U.S.C., section 2000e.
75. Re Andrews and Law Society of British Columbia, supra, note 51.
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VI. Impact of the Charter on Wage Equity and Pensions
A. Wage Equity
The Charter does not guarantee wage equity, nor does it oblige a legis-
lature to enact legislation to achieve wage equity. Nevertheless, Canadian
legislatures have addressed this issue. The federal Parliament and the legis-
latures of Quebec and Ontario have enacted legislation providing for
equal pay for work of equal value in the same establishment76 The
Manitoba legislature has gone further to introduce equal pay for work of
equal value but only for the public sector.77 Other provinces have adopted
the less onerous requirement of equal pay for equal work within the same
establishment78
The equal pay for equal work requirement is likely to have little im-
pact on the wage gap between men and women. It generally requires that
an employer pay a female employee the same wage as is paid to a male em-
ployee in the same establishment for doing essentially the same work in-
volving substantially the same skills, effort and responsibility and
performed under similar working conditions. It permits wage differentials
based upon a seniority system, a merit system, a system that measures pro-
duction, or any differential based on a factor other than sex. The equal pay
for equal work requirement has little impact because the wage gap is cre-
ated more by segregation of men and women into different occupations
and the undervaluing of women's work, than by overt discrimination be-
tween men and women who perform substantially the same job. 9 Indeed,
even the requirement that an employer provide equal pay for work of
equal value performed within the same establishment is not likely to ad-
dress the problems arising from the occupational segregation of women.
Some commentators have argued that because the legislation is inef-
fective in narrowing the wage gap in any significant way, it discriminates
against women and should be held to be of no force and effect.80 This argu-
ment is surely incorrect and, even if correct, does little to benefit women
workers since a court could not compel a legislature to replace the legisla-
tion with something more effective. Equal pay for equal work legislation
does not infringe constitutional rights because it applies equally to men
and women. Even if the legislationprima fade infringed section 15(1) of the
Charter, it could be supported under section 15(2) as a law designed to ame-
liorate the conditions of disadvantaged women workers. It is not necessary
to establish, under section 15(2), that the law in question is the most effec-
tive means possible for eliminating the entire disadvantage. A government
76. Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 19'76-77, c. 33, section 11. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,
RLS.Q. 197n, c. c-12, section 19. Pay Equity Act, S.O. 1987, c. 34.
77. Pay Equity Act, S.M. 1985-86, c. 21, sections 3 and 4(2).
78. See, e.g., Individual's Rights Protection Act, ILS.A., 1980, c. I-2, section 6; Human Rights Act, S..C. 1964, c
22, section 7.
79. Gunderson, supra, note 14 at 9.
80. Cornish, "Ontario Equal Pay Legislation...", supra, note 27, at 5.31 "Present Equal Pay for Equal
Work Legislation...", supra, note 27 at B.2-24.
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is entitled to address only certain aspects of the problem, perhaps in-
crementally, as it gauges public acceptance of its policies and initiatives.
It has also been suggested that sections 7 and 28 of the Charter could be
relied upon as guaranteeing equal economic security for men and women
and thus requiring equal pay for work of equal value. However, as noted
above, that argument is unlikely to be successful.81
Canada has entered into a series of international commitments to
provide equal treatment to women in employment.82 In 1980, Canada rati-
fied the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrnuna.
tion Against Women which provides, inter alia:
1. State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women in the field of employment in order to
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights in
particular...
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to
equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality
of treatment in the evaluation of quality of work,-
Accordingly, Canada has undertaken to adopt affirmative measures
to implement equal pay for work of equal value. However, the right was not
guaranteed in the Charter and the Charter provides no mechanism for com-
pelling its implementation..
B. Pensions
The Charter is likely to have an impact on sex distinctions in pension
plans, particularly distinctions that are expressly authorized by legislation.
In Ontario, section 34(2) of the Employment Standards AcL8 prohibits an em-
ployer from providing benefits that differentiate between employees on
the basis of age, sex or marital status, except as provided by regulation.
Regulation 282 permits distinctions to be drawn on the basis of sex, pro-
vided they are determined on an actuarial basis, and section 24(2) of The
Ontario Human Rights Code85 acknowledges the validity of this exception.
Similarly, the Canadian Human Rights Benefit Regulation8 s (promulgated
pursuant to section 11 of the Canadian Human Rights Act) permits differ-
ent treatment on account of sex for some types of pension plans provided
the difference is determined on an actuarial basis. Only in Manitoba does
section 21 of the Pension Benefits Ac0 8 prohibit different pension rates,
amounts of contributions, benefits, options or membership requirements
based on sex.
81. See text at notes 25 to 28.
82. See Cornish, "Ontario Equal Pay Legidation..", note 27 at 5.32-34; "Present Equal Pay for Equal Work
Legislation...', supra, note 27 at B.12-17).
83. Adopted 18 December 1979, in force for Canada 10 January 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Resr-41180 (1979),
reproduced in Bayefsky and Eberts, supra, note 25 at 62) ff.
84. F.S.O. 1980, c. 137.
85. Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 249.
86. Canadian Human Rights Benefit Regulations, SOF1.O-68, as am. by SORPS-512.
87. S.C. 1976-77, c. 33.
88. S.M. 1975, c. 38, section 21(6.4), as am. by S.M. 1982-83-84, c. 79, section 14.
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The exceptions in the Ontario and federal legislation are open to
challenge for permitting different treatment of men and women. The dis-
tinction could not be upheld under section 15(2) of the Charter since it does
not have as its object amelioration of conditions of disadvantage. Nor
should it be upheld under section I of the Charter since it is not required by
reproductive differences. Even if section 1 were given a more expansive
reading in relation to section 15 than is advocated in this paper, it is argu-
able that actuarial evidence of the different life expectancies of women
and men generally does not demonstrably justify different treatment of in-
dividual women and men.
In City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,89 the
United States Supreme Court held that a pension plan which required
women employees to make larger contributions than men in order to be
eligible for the same monthly benefits violated the Civil Rights Act, 1964.9o
The Court acknowledged that there was a verifiable difference in longevity
between men as a group and women as a group; the difference was not sim-
ply a fictional stereotype.91 Nonetheless, the Court noted that what is true
of a group is not necessarily true for each member of that group.9 Justice
Stevens held that the Civil Rights Act, 1964, which precludes discrimination
against an individual because of his or her sex,
... precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a
racial, religious, sexual or national class. If height is required for a
job, a tall woman may not be refused employment merely because,
on the average, women are too short. Even a true generalization
about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an indi-
vidual to whom the generalization does not apply.9
The Court subsequently affirmed and extended the application of this
reasoning in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris94 in which it held that
"Title VII also prohibits an employer from offering its employees
the option of receiving retirement benefits from one of several
companies selected by the employer, all of which pay a woman
lower monthly benefits than a man who has made the same contri-
butions."9
Canadian legislation which permits distinctions in pension plans on
the basis of sex should be held to infringe the Charter guarantee of equality
in the operation of law. In light of the policy adopted in Manitoba and the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it would be difficult to es-
tablish that legislation permitting such diverse treatment of individuals on
89. 435 U.S. 702, 56 L Ed 2d 657 (1978).
90. Civil Rights Act, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C., section 2000e-J 2(a)(l):
It shall be an unlawfhl employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....
91. City of Los Angees v. Manhart, supra, note 89 at 707.
92. Ibid., at 708.
93. Ibid., at 708.
94. 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
95. Ibid., at 3494.
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the basis of their sex alone is demonstrably justified in a free and demo-
cratic society. As argued above, since the diverse treatment is not related to
reproductive differences, it should not even be open to proponents of
such legislation to seek to justify it under section 1 of the Charter.
In addition to those legislative provisions which authorize different
treatment of men and women in pension plans, there are also provisions
pertaining both to government pensionsg8 and private pensions97 which
arguably have a disparate impact on women. These provisions are neutral
on their face, but they are predicated on the conventional career patterns
of men and the assumption that men support their wives. They have been
criticized as failing to provide sufficient flexibility to meet the rather dif-
ferent needs of women workers. Such "neutral" laws which have disparate
impact on women are ripe for challenge.
VU. Conclusion
Those who, armed with the Charter, look to the courts to eradicate in-
equality between working women and men are likely to be disappointed.
The Charter precludes legislatures and governments from creating or rein-
forcing inequalities in the laws which govern our society. Beyond that,
however, it imposes no aflirmative obligation to enhance equality or elimi-
nate inequality. Nonetheless, the importance of the guarantee of equality
in the operation of law should not be minimized. Laws play an ever in-
creasing role in our regulated society. The constitutional guarantee of
their equal operation promotes new awareness of minority interests in the
legislative process and provides a means for minorities to challenge laws
which treat or affect them adversely. To the extent, then, that inequalities
are the product of laws, redress can be had through the Charter. "Protec-
tive" legislation which is based on stereotyped notions of the differences
between and appropriate roles of men and women can be challenged as
unconstitutional as can apparently neutral legislation which has a dispa-
rate impact on men and women. Benefits conferred by law on men but
hitherto denied to women will either be extended to women or withdrawn
from men. Each constitutional challenge should provoke a searching as-
sessment of the assumptions which are reflected in and reinforced by legis-
lation.
The examination and rejection of various sexual stereotypes may en-
courage other social forces which support equality for women, but the
elimination of inequalities in the operation of law is unlikely in itself to
have more than marginal direct impact on women's inequality in employ-
ment. It will not equalize the sharing of household and family responsibili-
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ties, improve the availability of quality child care, or lead women to seek
out new opportunities in education, training and non-traditional careers.
The Charter does not provide a means for addressing - or compelling gov-
ernments to address - these social barriers to women's equality in em-
ployment. Governments may, but need not, address these social issues.
The Charter expressly permits, but does not require, laws, programs and
activities designed to ameliorate conditions of disadvantage. Theoreti-
cally - and notwithstanding the Charter - a legislature could decide to re-
turn to a/aissez faire system leaving the market to regulate employment. To
the extent that the legislature does intervene, however, it must do so even
handedly (unless, of course, it intervenes in the interests of a disadvan-
taged group). At most then, the equality guarantees will have only a mini-
mal constraining impact on employment policy and economic liberty.
Constraints on economic liberty in the form of equal pay for work of equal
value or obligatory affirmative action programs are more likely to be im-
posed by legislation or government contract compliance requirements.
Hence, the extent to which actual equality - as distinct from equality in
the operation of law - will be achieved in Canada remains substantially a
matter of political choice.
